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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit continued
its recent trend of issuing only a handful of trademark decisions—eight
decisions were issued from March to December1—followed by the
reinstatement of the trademark aspects of one such decision in May
2017.2 Notably, although the Federal Circuit’s caseload hit a twenty-year
high in 2016—addressing 1839 appeals3—trademark cases composed
only two percent of the court’s overall docket.4 Over the past decade,
trademark cases have not represented more than three percent of the
Federal Circuit’s docket and fell to a low of one percent in 2015.5
Nonetheless, as aptly illustrated by the court’s decisions in 2015—

1. See Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc. v. Roese, 666 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir.
2016); In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Christian Faith Fellowship
Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Light, 662 F. App’x 929 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); Westlake v. Barrera, 659 F. App’x 622 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam); In re
Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.
(Romag I), 817 F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016); JBLU, Inc. v. United States, 813 F.3d 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
2. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag II), 686 F. App’x. 889 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (per curiam).
3. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, HISTORICAL CASELOAD (2017),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/Historical_
Caseload_Graph_83-17.pdf.
4. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED, BY CATEGORY: FY
2016 (2017), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FY16_
Caseload_by_Category.pdf.
5. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILE, BY CATEGORY: FY 2015
(2016),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Caseload%20by%20Category
%20%282015%29.pdf (reporting trademark cases as making up one percent of the Federal
Circuit docket); see also Statistics, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
the-court/statistics (last visited May 9, 2018) (providing annual statistics from Fiscal
Year (FY) 2006 through FY 2017 under the “Caseload, by Category” section, indicating
that trademark appeals have constituted no more than three percent of the Federal
Circuit’s docket in the last decade).
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including In re Tam6 and Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics. Co.,7 which raised
issues later addressed by the Supreme Court—the relatively small number
of trademark decisions should not be equated with a small contribution
to trademark jurisprudence.8 As discussed in detail below, the Federal
Circuit’s 2016 decisions continue the practice of making an outsized
contribution with only a few well-reasoned decisions.9
I.

SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES

The Federal Circuit issued five decisions addressing substantive
trademark issues in 2016 and reinstated one of these decisions in 2017.
Each of these decisions is discussed below.
A. Meaning of “Trademark” in Tariff Act
JBLU, Inc. v. United States
For its first trademark case of 2016, JBLU, Inc. v. United States,10 the
Federal Circuit reversed the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT)
to hold that the term “trademark,” as used in a regulation
implementing section 304 of the Tariff Act, was clear on its face and
referred to both federally registered and common law unregistered
trademarks. The Federal Circuit rejected the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection’s (CBP) narrow interpretation which only accounted for
federally registered trademarks.11
This case arose from jean shipments from China to a U.S.-based

1.

6. 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)
(addressing First Amendment issues related to registration of disparaging marks).
7. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (addressing
functionality of registered trade dress for design of on-screen icons).
8. See Linda K. McLeod & Lindsay B. Allen, 2015 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1029–30 (2016) (emphasizing the significance of Tam and
noting that the decision will likely shape trademark examinations going forward).
9. This Article uses the term “trademark decisions” to refer primarily to decisions
that substantively address claims under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n (2012), and the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683 (2012).
Practitioners should be aware that this Article is a survey only of the 2016 trademark
decisions issued by the Federal Circuit that substantively address trademark issues, and
that other opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2016 may also impact trademark
law practice but are not considered or discussed herein. For a summary of 2017
trademark decisions, see Anita B. Polott & Rachel E. Fertig, 2017 Trademark Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1355 (2018).
10. 813 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
11. Id. at 1382.

1414

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1411

importer.12 Between September 11, 2010 and October 20, 2010,
California-based company JBLU, Inc., operating under the name C’est
Toi Jeans USA, imported over 350,000 pairs of jeans embroidered with
“C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans USA,” and “C’est Toi Jeans Los
Angeles”—all of which were manufactured in China.13 Simultaneously,
JBLU also filed for federal registration of two trademarks: “C’est Toi
Jeans USA” and “CT Jeans USA” (collectively, “CT Marks”).14 Upon
arrival to the United States, CBP inspected the jeans and found that
their “Made in China” tags were not sufficiently conspicuous to mark the
country of origin for the jeans, as required under section 304 of the
Tariff Act and its implementing regulations.15 In particular, the
implementing regulations—19 C.F.R. § 134.46 and 19 C.F.R. § 134.47—
provide distinct standards for marking the country of origin in instances
where a geographical location—such as “United States,” “USA,” “or the
name of any city or location in the United States”16—appears on an
imported article and may mislead the ultimate purchaser as to the actual
country of origin.17
For importers, the two regulations have different consequences.
Under 19 C.F.R. § 134.46, the imported article must be marked with
the country of origin “in close proximity to [the location] words [(e.g.,
USA)]” and “in at least a comparable size” font.18 By contrast, under
12. Id. at 1378.
13. Id. (“[I]n various fonts on their backs, pocket linings, back waistbands, and
hangtags.”). See Kevin J. Fandl, 2016 International Trade Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1402–04 (2018).
14. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1378 (noting that applications were submitted on
October 8, 2010).
15. Id. Section 304 of the Tariff Act requires marking of the country-of-origin—in
this case China—“in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the
nature of the article . . . will permit” as specified in regulations issued by the Secretary
of Treasury, i.e., Customs. Id. at 1378–79 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2012)).
16. 19 C.F.R. § 134.46 (2017).
17. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1379.
18. 19 C.F.R. § 134.46 discusses the use of a mark when the name of a country
other than the country of origin is used:
In any case in which the words “United States,” or “American,” the letters
“U.S.A.,” any variation of such words or letters, or the name of any city or
location in the United States, or the name of any foreign country or locality
other than the country or locality in which the article was manufactured or
produced appear on an imported article or its container, and those words,
letters or names may mislead or deceive the ultimate purchaser as to the actual
country of origin of the article, there shall appear legibly and permanently in
close proximity to such words, letters or name, and in at least a comparable
size, the name of the country of origin preceded by “Made in,” “Product of,”
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19 C.F.R. § 134.47, when “the name of a location in the United States
or ‘United States’” appears as “part of a trademark or trade name,” the
country of origin marking only needs to be “in close proximity [to the
location of the words, letters, or name] or in some other conspicuous
location.” And § 134.47 does not require the imported article’s
country of origin to be written in a comparable font size.19
Noting the small font and distant location of the “Made in China”
mark from the prominent embroidery in the jeans, CBP found JBLU in
violation of the more stringent standard under § 134.46 with respect to
the jeans imported before it had filed for federal trademark registration
of the CT Marks.20 For these jeans imported before an application for
federal registration had been filed, CBP determined that JBLU’s use of
the embroidered words “USA” and “Los Angeles” could not be
considered part of a trademark; thus, such jeans could not be evaluated
under the more lenient country-of-origin standard under § 134.47.21
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the CIT upheld CBP’s
application of the strict standard under § 134.46, according CBP’s
narrow interpretation of “trademark” under § 134.47 substantial
deference because the term was not defined and CBP’s interpretation
was not plainly erroneous.22 JBLU appealed.23
The Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s determination de novo and
reversed its decision.24 Specifically, the court rejected the CIT’s
deference to CBP and re-affirmed that “[i]f a regulation is clear on its
face, no deference is given to the promulgating agency’s
interpretation.”25 Instead, the regulation is interpreted “in accordance
with its unambiguous meaning.”26 In this case, the Federal Circuit held
that the “[t]he word ‘trademark’ in § 134.47 unambiguously includes
trademarks without a pending [federal trademark] application.”27 The
Federal Circuit explained that this interpretation was consistent with
dictionary and Lanham Act definitions that existed at the time of the

or other words of similar meaning.
19 C.F.R. § 134.46.
19. Id. § 134.47.
20. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1379–80.
21. Id. at 1379.
22. Id. at 1380.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1380, 1382.
25. Id. at 1380.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1381.
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original issuance of § 134.47.28 Moreover, the court noted that the
current Lanham Act definition of trademark continues to support this
broad interpretation because “trademark rights stem from use, not
registration,”29 and, as recognized in San Juan Products, Inc. v. San Juan
Pools of Kansas, Inc.,30 “[t]he Lanham Act protects unregistered marks as
does the common law.”31 Thus, “trademark” within the meaning of
§ 134.47 included federally registered and common-law trademarks.
Accordingly, CBP should have applied the more lenient marking
requirement under § 134.47.
B. Willfulness Requirement to Recover Infringer’s Profits
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. ( Romag I)
In its first decision in Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag I ),32 the
Federal Circuit considered an appeal from a decision of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut, finding that, as a matter of law in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a trademark owner could not
recover a defendant’s profits for trademark infringement where the jury
had found that the defendant’s trademark infringement was not willful.33
Trademark owner, Romag Fasteners, Inc. (“Romag”), owns a patent
on magnetic snap fasteners, which it sells—for wallets, purses,
handbags, and other products—under its registered trademark,
ROMAG (Registration No. 2,095,367).34 Beginning in 2002, Fossil, Inc.
(“Fossil”) agreed to use ROMAG magnetic snap fasteners in Fossil
products and to purchase the fasteners from the authorized
manufacturer, Wing Yip Metal Manufactory Accessories Limited
(“Wing Yip”).35 Years later, in 2010, Romag learned that some Fossil
handbags contained counterfeit fasteners and filed suit against Fossil
and retailers of its products for trademark and patent infringement.36
1.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 849 F.2d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that both the Lanham Act and the
common law protect unregistered marks).
31. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1381.
32. 817 F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017).
33. Id. at 784–85.
34. Id. at 783 (noting that Romag “owns U.S. Patent No. 5,777,126 (‘the ’126
patent’) on magnetic snap fasteners”); see Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag
III), 866 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that Romag owns Patent No.
5,722,126 and trademark Registration No. 2,095,367).
35. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 783.
36. Id.
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At trial, Fossil was found liable for patent and trademark infringement.37
With respect to trademark infringement, the jury recommended an award
comprised of “$90,759.36 of Fossil’s profits under an unjust enrichment
theory, and $6,704,046.00 of Fossil’s profits under a deterrence theory.”38
The district court, however, dismissed the recommended trademark award
as contrary to law because the Second Circuit required willfulness to award
an infringer’s profits, and Fossil had not been found to have willfully
infringed the ROMAG mark.39 Romag appealed this decision to the
Federal Circuit claiming, inter alia, that to recover an infringing
defendant’s profits as damages, a trademark owner does not have to
prove that an infringer acted willfully.40
As part of its de novo review of the legal standard for awarding profits
derived from trademark infringement, the Federal Circuit undertook
an extensive analysis of the Lanham Act’s legislative history, as well as
the numerous court opinions creating an apparent circuit split
concerning whether willfulness is required to obtain an infringer’s
profits.41 Starting with cases supporting a willfulness requirement, the
Federal Circuit discussed the decisions of several courts of appeals,
including George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc.42 from the Second Circuit,
whose precedent governed this case.43 Notably, George Basch held that
“under [15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)] of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove
that an infringer acted with willful deception before the infringer’s

37. Id. at 784. In addition to the trademark damages discussed above, the jury
found that Fossil was liable for patent infringement and recommended a reasonable
royalty award to Romag of $ 51,052.14. Id. However, because Romag waited to bring
the suit until just three days before “Black Friday,” the district court deemed such delay
to constitute laches, which bars claims if the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay causes the
defendant undue prejudice, and thus reduced the jury’s reasonable royalty award by
“[eighteen percent] to exclude sales made during the period of delay.” Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 784–85.
40. Id. at 784.
41. Id. at 784–85, 787.
42. 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992).
43. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785–86 (citing SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom
Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff must prove that an infringer acted
willfully before the infringer’s profits are recoverable.”(alteration in original); ALPO
Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990)), superseded by
statute, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999),
as recognized in Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d. Cir. 2005); Bishop v.
Equinox Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n award of profits
requires proof that ‘“defendant’s actions were willful or in bad faith.’”)). The Federal
Circuit noted that these cases pre-dated the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act. Id.
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profits [could be] recoverable by way of an accounting.”44 The Federal
Circuit also noted that, although the Supreme Court had never
addressed whether proof of willfulness is a prerequisite to recovering
an infringing party’s profits, the Court had issued two pre-Lanham Act
opinions that remained relevant to the question.45
First, in Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co.,46 the Court held that a group of
trademark infringers who had either “acted in good faith” or made
only small sales, “should not be required to account for gains and
profits.”47 Second, in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co.,48
the Supreme Court “affirmed an accounting of [an] infringer’s profits
where” there was “abundant evidence” to show that the defendant
“persiste[d] in the unlawful simulation in the face of the very plain
notice of [the trademark owner’s] rights.”49
As additional support, the Federal Circuit cited The Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition, which “took the position that ‘[o]ne . . . is liable for
the net profits earned on profitable transactions resulting from
[trademark infringement], but only if . . . the actor engaged in the
conduct with the intention of causing confusion or deception.’”50 To
illustrate the circuit split, the Federal Circuit also discussed decisions from
several courts of appeals that generally took the position that willfulness
was a relevant factor—but not a prerequisite—to awarding defendant’s
profits derived from trademark infringement.51

44. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1540
(explaining further that a “finding of willful deceptiveness is necessary in order to
warrant an accounting for profits . . . [but] it may not be sufficient” (first alteration in
original))). The Federal Circuit also cited Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy
Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In order to recover an
accounting of an infringer’s profits, a plaintiff must prove that the infringer acted in
bad faith.”)). Id. at 785.
45. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785.
46. 179 U.S. 42 (1900).
47. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785 (quoting Saxlehner, 179 U.S. at 42–43).
48. 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
49. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785 (last two alterations in original) (quoting HamiltonBrown Shoe Co., 240 U.S. at 261).
50. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 37(1) (AM. LAW INST., 1995)).
51. Id. at 786. The Federal Circuit cited to cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit to support its
finding. See id. (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that “the intent to confuse or deceive” is only a “relevant factor[ ] to
the court’s determination of whether an award of profits is appropriate”); Wynn Oil
Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 607 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that proof of
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Romag argued that the Second Circuit’s George Basch opinion and
similar cases were invalidated by a 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act.52
In responding to, and ultimately rejecting, this argument, the Federal
Circuit explained that when George Basch and similar decisions were
issued—before the 1999 amendment—“the Lanham Act [under
§ 1117(a)] permitted recovery only for violations of § 1125(a), i.e.,
trademark infringement and false advertising.”53 Between 1996 and 1999,
Congress amended the Lanham Act a number of times to create a new
cause of action for trademark dilution and accompanying injunctive and
monetary relief.54 Notably, in 1999, Congress had to amend § 1117(a) to
correct an error from the 1996 amendments that had omitted language
necessary to award monetary relief for willful dilution.55 As relevant to this
case, the current language of § 1117(a) states that
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered
in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of
this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under
this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions
of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles
of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.56

Romag interpreted the change made under the 1999 amendment—
specifically, the express inclusion of the “willful” requirement for
violations under § 1125(c) for dilution without adding a similarly express
requirement for trademark infringement under § 1125(a)—to prove
that: (1) “Congress chose to make willful infringement a prerequisite to
actual confusion is not required to recover profits, and quoting the Seventh Circuit
rule that “there is no express requirement . . . that the infringer willfully infringe . . .
to justify an award of profits”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roulo v.
Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989)); Roulo, 886 F.2d at 941 (“Other
than general equitable considerations, there is no express requirement that . . . the
infringer willfully infringe the trade dress to justify an award of profits.”); Burger King
Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Nor is an award of profits based
on either unjust enrichment or deterrence dependent upon a higher showing of
culpability on the part of the defendant, who is purposely using the trademark.”)).
52. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 786–88.
53. Id. at 787.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–43, § 3(b),
113 Stat. 218, 219 (1999)) (alterations in original) (explaining that the 1996
amendment made available “‘the remed[y] set forth in section[ ] 1117(a) without
amending § 1117(a) to provide for such monetary remedies in the case of dilution”).
56. Id. at 787–88 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012)).
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recovery of monetary relief for trademark dilution”; and (2) Congress
“did not intend [for] willful infringement to be a prerequisite to recovery
of monetary relief for the other types of infringement covered by that
section, including the sale of counterfeits.”57
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Romag’s arguments based on the
1999 amendment and interpreted the addition of the
“willful violation” language . . . to distinguish dilution cases from, inter
alia, infringement cases in the area of damages (as opposed to
profits), since it was established in the courts of appeals that willfulness
was not required for damages recovery, . . . and Congress wished to
limit damages awards for dilution to cases involving willfulness.58

Although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that certain circuits
shared Romag’s interpretation,59 the Federal Circuit applies the law of
the circuit from which a case is appealed.60 Thus, the Federal Circuit
evaluated the case according to Second Circuit precedent, which, like
many other circuits,61 continued, after the 1999 amendment, to
require the trademark owner to prove the defendant’s willful
infringement in order to secure an award of profits for all violations
covered under § 1117(a).62 Of particular importance to the Federal
Circuit was a 2014 Second Circuit decision, Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis
S.P.A.,63 which reaffirmed George Basch’s holding that “a finding of
defendant’s willful deceptiveness is a prerequisite for awarding

57. Id. at 788.
58. Id. at 790.
59. Id. at 788 (citing Laukus v. Rio Brands, Inc., 391 F. App’x 416, 424 (6th Cir.
2010); Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006); Banjo
Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005) (“By adding this word
[‘willful’] to the statute in 1999, but limiting it to [§ 1125(c)] violations, Congress
effectively superseded the willfulness requirement as applied to [§ 1125(a)].”
(alterations in original)); Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349
(5th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999)).
60. Id. at 784.
61. Id. at 788 (citing Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d
1059, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Awarding profits is proper only where the defendant
is attempting to gain the value of an established name of another. Willful infringement
carries a connotation of deliberate intent to deceive.”); Fishman Transducers, Inc. v.
Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir. 2012); M2 Software Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 223 F. App’x
653, 656 (9th Cir. 2007); W. Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427
F.3d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 2005)).
62. Id. at 789.
63. 760 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
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profits.”64 Moreover, the Federal Circuit saw “nothing in the 1999
amendment [to] permit [it] to declare that the governing Second
Circuit precedent [was] no longer good law.”65 Thus, based upon the
Federal Circuit’s application of the George Basch test, it affirmed the
district court’s decision that “Romag [was] not entitled to recover
Fossil’s profits, as Romag did not prove that Fossil infringed willfully.”66
Romag appealed the Romag I decision to the Supreme Court.67
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. ( Romag II)
On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari of the Romag
I decision and simultaneously vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision.68
The Court remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in a patent case, SCA
Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC.69
In a per curiam opinion on May 3, 2017, the Federal Circuit
reinstated sections II and III of its Romag I decision, affirming the
district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits.70 Simply
put, the Federal Circuit reinstated its determination that the Second
Circuit’s willfulness requirement for claiming a trademark infringer’s
profits remains good law. The Federal Circuit reasoned that such
2.

64. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 789 (quoting George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968
F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992)).
65. Id. at 789–90 (noting that the legislative “history [of the 1999 amendment] does
not even acknowledge the pre-1999 split in the courts of appeals on the willfulness
requirement for a recovery of infringer’s profits, much less indicate a desire to change it”).
66. Id. at 791. Although not relevant in the instant case because there was no
threshold finding of willfulness, George Basch also holds that although “a finding of
willful deceptiveness is necessary in order to warrant an accounting for profits . . . it
may not be sufficient,” meaning, equitable factors must also be evaluated, even after
the threshold willfulness requirement is satisfied. George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1540–
41. Such equitable factors include: “(1) the degree of certainty that the defendant
benefited from the unlawful conduct; (2) availability and adequacy of other remedies;
(3) the role of a particular defendant in effectuating the infringement; (4) plaintiff’s
laches; and (5) plaintiff’s unclean hands.” Id. (“The district court’s discretion lies in
assessing the relative importance of these factors and determining whether, on the
whole, the equities weigh in favor of an accounting. As the Lanham Act dictates, every
award is ‘subject to equitable principles’ and should be determined ‘according to the
circumstances of the case.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988)).
67. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1373, 1373 (2017).
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954 (2017)) (rejecting laches as a defense against damages for alleged patent
infringement that occurred within a limitations period).
70. Romag II, 686 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

1422

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1411

reinstatement was proper, given the Supreme Court’s direction to
reconsider the Romag I decision in light of SCA Hygiene, which “was
solely concerned with the defense of laches against a claim for patent
infringement damages” and, therefore, had no effect on the trademark
aspects of the Romag I decision contained in sections II and III.71 The
time for appeal has passed with no further appeal being requested.72
C. Genericness
In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc.
Among the substantive trademark decisions issued by the Federal Circuit
in 2016 was an analysis of genericness in In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc.73 In
this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board’s (TTAB) refusal to register a stylized form of the word mark
“CHURRASCOS”—a common term for grilled meat—finding substantial
evidence supporting TTAB’s determination that the term was generic as
applied to a chain of restaurants serving a signature dish of grilled steak.74
In 2008, Cordua obtained Registration No. 3,439,321 (the
“Registration”) for the service mark CHURRASCOS (in standard
character format) for use of the word in connection with “restaurant
and bar services; catering.”75 In 2011, under application 85,214,191 (the
“Application”), Cordua sought registration of the mark at issue in this
case—a stylized form of CHURRASCOS for use in connection with
“[b]ar and restaurant services; [c]atering.”76
1.

71. Id. On August 9, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued its revised opinion on the
patent issue involved in Romag I in light the SCA Hygiene decision. Romag III, 866 F.3d
1330, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
72. On June 9, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued a “mandate” for its Romag II
decision (which reinstated the Romag I decision as to the trademark issues). The
Federal Circuit issues a mandate “[seven] days after the time to file a petition for
rehearing expires, or [seven] days after entry of an order denying a timely petition for
panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate,
whichever is later.” FED. R. APP. P. 41. Additionally, the time to file another petition
for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court expired ninety days after the Federal
Circuit issued its decision in Romag II on May 3, 2017.
73. 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
74. Id. at 598, 606; see also In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1234
(T.T.A.B. 2014) (affirming refusal of registration of Serial No. 85/214,191), aff’d, 823
F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
75. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 598.
76. Id.
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Figure 1: Cordua’s Mark in the Application

The Application was rejected as generic under Lanham Act
section 2(e)(1),77 and, on appeal, the TTAB affirmed the examiner’s
refusal, agreeing that “‘churrascos’ is the generic term for a type of
cooked meat and a generic term for a restaurant featuring churrasco
steaks.’”78 Further, the TTAB held that “Cordua’s earlier registration
of the underlying CHURRASCOS word mark . . . had no bearing on
whether the stylized form of CHURRASCOS was generic.”79
Cordua appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the
Registration had “achieved incontestable status” after five years of use and
that TTAB’s “failure to fully consider the incontestable registration [in
evaluating the Application was reversible] error.”80 At a minimum,
Cordua argued the presumption of validity accorded to the Registration
based upon its registration on the Principal Register should have served
as prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark in the Application
because both use the same word for the same services.81
The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed all prior
findings of genericness. Its opinion can be separated into four parts.
First, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that incontestability is irrelevant
for the purposes of determining whether a mark is generic because a
“registered mark that has become generic may be cancelled at any
time.”82 Second, the Federal Circuit explained that the presumption
77. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2012).
78. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 598 (quoting In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110
U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1232, 1234) (“The Board also agreed with the examiner that the
stylized form of CHURRASCOS was also ineligible for registration because it is merely
descriptive of a restaurant serving barbecued steaks and because Cordua had not
provided sufficient evidence of acquired distinctiveness.”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 597–99.
81. Id. at 600 (“The general presumption of validity resulting from federal registration
includes the specific presumption that the trademark is not generic.”(quoting Coca-Cola
Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982)).
82. Id. at 599–600 (citing Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
194 (1985) (“Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may be canceled
at any time on the grounds that it has become generic.”); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Generic terms, by
definition incapable of indicating source, are the antithesis of trademarks, and can

1424

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1411

of a registration’s validity does not attach to a new application for a
mark that is similar or identical.83 Instead, every new application for
trademark registration will be reviewed separately on the merits.84
Third, in assessing whether the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) met its burden to prove genericness of the stylized mark at issue
by clear and convincing evidence, the Federal Circuit explained the
issue is not whether “CHURRASCOS” is considered generic in terms
of Cordua’s restaurants, but whether the term identifies a broader
group of restaurant services as understood by the general public.85
Specifically, the court held that the PTO must apply the two-part test
established in H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass’n of Fire Chiefs,
Inc.86 to (1) determine “the genus of goods or services at issue” and
(2) whether “the term sought to be registered or retained on the
register [is] understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that
genus of goods or services.”87
The Federal Circuit noted that the TTAB “misse[d] the point” in the
few instances where its analysis suggested “that ‘churrascos’ is generic
as applied to Cordua’s own restaurant services.”88 Ultimately, however,
the court upheld the TTAB’s decision, finding that it had substantial
evidence on which to affirm the examining attorney’s determination
that “the general public (the consumers of restaurant services)
understands that churrascos is generic for a type of restaurant,
specifically a restaurant that serves ‘churrascos.’”89
In particular, the court affirmed that the TTAB was correct to base its
genericness determination upon three English-language dictionaries
defining “churrasco” as grilled meat—and, under the foreign
equivalents doctrine,90 “would have been justified in translating

never attain trademark status.”)).
83. Id. at 600.
84. Id. (quoting In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
85. Id. at 602 (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782
F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
86. 782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
87. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 601 (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp., 782 F.2d at 990).
88. Id. at 602. The court cited In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359,
1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009), to explain that the inquiry should focus on the “goods or
services for which the applicant sought protection, as set forth in its trademark
application.” See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 602.
89. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 601 (citing In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 110
U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1229 (T.T.A.B. 2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
90. The doctrine of foreign equivalents is the doctrine by which the PTO considers
the English translation of foreign language marks when it evaluates the similarity of
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‘churrascos’ into ‘barbecue’ and subsequently determining whether the
term ‘barbecue’ is generic when applied to restaurant services.”91 The
TTAB was also correct to give no weight to the addition of “S” to make
the word plural (whether such spelling was correct or not).92
Additionally, in response to Cordua’s argument that an individual
menu item does not indicate the type of restaurant services, the
Federal Circuit clarified that a generic term for a classification of goods
is also generic for any services centered on those goods.93 Accordingly,
the court did not find an error in the TTAB’s reliance on a number of
newspaper and magazine articles showing that “the restaurant-going
public understands the term ‘churrascos’ to refer to a type of
restaurant as well as a dish” and thus, the mark refers to a class of
restaurants, and the public uses the mark to refer to that class of
restaurant.94 At the same time, the Federal Circuit noted that this
decision should not be interpreted to “suggest that the term
‘churrascos’ is necessarily generic as to any and all restaurant
services”—to the contrary, the result may have differed in an
application for “a narrower sub-genre of restaurant” like “vegetarian or
sushi restaurants” whose main feature is not grilled meat.95
Lastly, the Federal Circuit assessed Cordua’s argument that the
stylization of the CHURRASCOS mark in a “unique and arbitrary font”
rendered it eligible for registration on the Principal Register.96 To be
sure, a mark that is descriptive or otherwise unregistrable on the
Principal Register may be registrable if “the design features of the
asserted mark create an impression on the purchasers separate and apart from
the impression made by the words themselves, or if it can be shown . . . that
the particular display . . . has acquired distinctiveness.”97 Cordua failed to
establish that the stylization of CHURRASCOS satisfied either of these
alternative bases of registrability. Specifically, the Federal Circuit
concluded that “Cordua did not argue . . . that [the] stylization

marks as a factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
91. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 603.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 604 (quoting In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1791
(T.T.A.B. 2002)).
94. Id. (internal citations omitted).
95. Id. at 605.
96. Id. at 606.
97. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Sadoru Grp., Ltd., 105 U.S.P.Q.2d 1484, 1486
(T.T.A.B. 2012)).
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create[d] a separate impression.”98 Similarly, the Federal Circuit
determined that Cordua “did not argue that the stylization (i.e., the
graphic quality) of the stylized form of CHURRASCOS [had] acquired
distinctiveness.”99 Rather, Cordua “argued only that the underlying
word mark ha[d] acquired distinctiveness”—which, the Federal Circuit
explained, could not “save [the mark] from ineligibility as generic.”100
D. Use in Commerce
Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG
In another case examining the fundamentals of trademark
protection, Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG,101 the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed the broad meaning of “use in commerce” under the
Lanham Act and, accordingly, reversed the TTAB’s cancellation of the
mark “ADD A ZERO” on hats based upon its narrow interpretation of
“use in commerce.”102 In particular, the Federal Circuit disagreed with
the TTAB holding that the “documented sale of two marked hats to an
out-of-state resident were de minimis and therefore did not constitute
use of the marks in commerce under the Lanham Act.”103
In March 2005, Christian Faith Fellowship Church (“Church”)
submitted two trademark applications—“one for use of ‘ADD A ZERO’ in
standard characters and another for a stylized design of the phrase”—
based upon actual sales, including the sale of two hats bearing the mark
in February 2005.104
Based upon a likelihood of confusion with these marks, the PTO
refused adidas AG’s (“Adidas”) application for the clothing mark
“ADIZERO.”105 Adidas filed to cancel the Church’s registrations, arguing,
among other things, that it failed to use the marks in commerce before
registration.106 The TTAB considered the Church’s cancelled check for
the sale of the two marked hats for $38.34 in February 2005, but found
1.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
102. Id. at 995.
103. Id. at 987. In addition, the Federal Circuit held that the check at issue was
admissible under the business records exception to hearsay and that substantial
evidence supported TTAB’s finding that parishioner who wrote the check resided outof-state, in Wisconsin. See id. at 989–90.
104. Id. at 988.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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that such sales “within the state of Illinois to [a person] who reside[d]
outside the state [did] not affect commerce that Congress can regulate”
as required under the Lanham Act.107 In short, such sales were
“insufficient to show use that affects interstate commerce.”108
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), in order to register a trademark, the
owner must show that the applied-for mark has been “used in
commerce.”109 The Lanham Act explains that use means “the bona
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark,” for instance, when a mark is used on “goods
[that] are sold or transported in commerce.”110 Further, the Lanham Act
defines the term “commerce” to include “all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”111
The Federal Circuit reiterated that “Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause is broad.”112 In particular, the court cited the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn,113 which interpreted
the Commerce Clause to vest Congress with the power to “regulate
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce . . .
‘[e]ven if . . . [the particular] activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce.’”114 This broad “substantial effects”
interpretation has been repeatedly and recently reaffirmed, including
by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich115 as well as Taylor v United
States.116 Raich reaffirmed that when “a general regulatory statute bears

107. Id.
108. Id. at 988–99.
109. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2012).
110. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 989 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
112. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 990 (citing Larry Harmon Pictures
Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
113. 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (holding that activity must be considered in the
aggregate, and that the appellee-wheat farmer’s “own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where . . . his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial”).
114. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 991 (second and third alterations
in original) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
115. 545 U.S. 1, 6–8, 17 (2005) (upholding application of the Commerce Clause to
personal cultivation of marijuana, noting that “case law firmly establishes Congress’s
power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce”).
116. 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2077–78 (2016) (concerning interpretation of a statutory
provision that defines “commerce” under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (2012) to include
“all . . . commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction”).
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a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence,”
and Congress has the power to regulate it under the Commerce
Clause.117 And, of particular relevance to the Church’s claim to its
ADD A ZERO registrations, Taylor clarified that “proof that the . . .
conduct in and of itself affected or threatened commerce is not
needed,” rather, “[a]ll that is needed is proof that the . . . conduct fell
within a category of conduct that, in the aggregate, had the requisite
effect” on commerce.118 The Federal Circuit also cited many of its past
Lanham Act “use in commerce” cases to support the broad scope of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, noting that the TTAB “erred by
not properly applying [its] holdings in [Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v.
Williams Restaurant Corp.]119 and [In re Silenus Wines].”120
Based upon this extensive recounting of case law confirming the
broad scope of the Lanham Act’s definition of commerce as “all activity
regulable by Congress,” the Federal Circuit held that it was “clear . . .
that the Church’s sale of two ‘ADD A ZERO’-marked hats to an out-ofstate resident [was] regulable by Congress under the Commerce Clause
and, therefore, constitute[d] ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham
Act.”121 The Federal Circuit went on to explain that the Church did not
need to demonstrate actual and specific effect of interstate commerce
or that the hats were destined for out-of-state travel.122 Moreover, the
Federal Circuit clarified that any cases that may conclude that the
Lanham Act “requires commercial activities . . . beyond that which is
sufficient for Congress to regulate commercial activity under the
Commerce Clause,” are not correct and the TTAB was wrong to rely on
them.123 Having reversed the TTAB’s decision to cancel the mark for
failure to use it in commerce, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for
117. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 991 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 17).
118. Id. at 992 (second alteration in original) (quoting Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081).
119. 929 F.2d 662, 666 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (refusing to adopt a de minimis test for use
in commerce determinations).
120. 557 F.2d 806, 808–10 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the intrastate sale of
imported French wine constituted “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act); see
Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 992–94.
121. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 987, 992–93 (stating further that
“it cannot be doubted that the transaction at issue—the private sale of goods,
particularly apparel, to an out-of-state resident—is ‘quintessentially economic’”).
122. Id. at 993.
123. Id. at 994–95 (explaining that the underlying meaning of “in commerce” in
the Lanham Act is the same as the Commerce Clause and is governed by Larry Harmon
and the Supreme Court decisions discussed above).
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the TTAB to address Adidas’s other grounds for cancellation.124
E. Proper Identification of Goods and Services
In re Jobdiva, Inc.
In In re Jobdiva, Inc.,125 the Federal Circuit considered a case in which
the TTAB granted a counterclaim for cancellation based on a bright
line rule that if a term is used as the name of a product (in this case a
computer program) that is sold or licensed in commerce, that name
cannot also be a service mark unless it is specifically used to identify a
separate service offered in connection with that product. The Federal
Circuit vacated the TTAB decision after determining that the TTAB
had applied the wrong test in evaluating whether the mark was used in
connection with certain services.126
The TTAB applied this bright-line test to two service mark
registrations owned by JobDiva, Inc. (“JobDiva”) for services that it
primarily offered through a “software as a service” (“SaaS”) model.127
Specifically, JobDiva secured the first registration in June 2004 for the
standard character mark JOBDIVA under Registration No. 2,851,917,
covering “personnel placement and recruitment” services (the “Word
Mark”).128 In November 2005, JobDiva obtained Registration No.
3,013,235 for its design.129

1.

Figure 2: JobDiva Design Mark

The registration states that it covers “personnel placement and
recruitment services; computer services, namely, providing databases
featuring recruitment and employment, employment advertising,
career information and resources, resume creation, resume transmittals

124. Id. at 995.
125. 843 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
126. Id. at 937.
127. Id. at 937–38, 941 (“As the Board explained, JobDiva’s SaaS model of software
delivery also changes the way that users interact with JobDiva: ‘The users pay for the
computing as a service rather than owning the machines and software to do it.’”
(quoting JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, at *2)).
128. JOBDIVA, Registration No. 2,851,917.
129. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 937.
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and communication of responses thereto via a global computer
network” (“Design Mark”).130
In April 2009, JobDiva petitioned to cancel a registration for the
mark JOBVITE, claiming it was likely to be confused with its federally
registered JOBDIVA trademarks.131
In June 2009, Jobvite
counterclaimed seeking cancellation of the JOBDIVA registrations as
they relate to and for failure “to perform personnel placement and
recruitment services.”132 After years of unsuccessful settlement
negotiations between the parties, the TTAB resumed proceedings and
concluded that JobDiva had not presented any evidence to support its
claim that it used the JOBDIVA marks in connection with “personnel
placement and recruitment services” separate and apart from the sale
of the computer program. On this basis, the TTAB granted the
counterclaim and ordered the PTO to (a) cancel the Word Mark
registration in whole and (b) amend the Design Mark registration by
deleting the “personnel placement and recruitment” services. JobDiva
filed a request for reconsideration of that decision and the TTAB
denied that request. At the same time, the TTAB denied the petition
to cancel the JOBVITE registration.133 JobDiva appealed the decision
on the counterclaim but did not appeal the denial of its petition to
cancel the JOBVITE registration.134
In reviewing the TTAB analysis, the Federal Circuit disagreed with
the TTAB’s bright-line approach, holding that it “erred in its
understanding of the law” by requiring JobDiva to “prove that ‘it [was]
rendering “personnel placement and recruitment” as an independent
activity distinct from providing its software to others.’”135 Instead, the
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he proper question is whether JobDiva,
through its software, performed personnel placement and recruitment
services and whether consumers would associate JobDiva’s registered
marks with personnel placement and recruitment services, regardless
of whether the steps of the service were performed by software.”136

130. Id.; see JOBDIVA, Registration No. 3,013,235.
131. JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 2170162, at
*1–3 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2015).
132. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 938.
133. JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 2170162, at *18.
134. Brief for Appellant at 2, In re JobDiva, Inc., 843 F.3d. 936 (No. 15-1960), 2015
WL 6948862, at *2.
135. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 939–41 (quoting JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No.
92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, at *4).
136. Id. at 937.
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The Federal Circuit noted that this fact-specific approach aligned with
the TTAB’s “initial observation that, with modern technology, the line
between services and products sometimes blurs”137 and that “‘[i]n today’s
commercial context if a customer goes to a company’s website and
accesses the company’s software to conduct some type of business, the
company may be rendering a service, even though the service utilizes
software.’”138 Based on these modern complexities, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that “[t]o determine whether a mark is used in connection with
the services described in the registration,” the TTAB must factually assess,
on a case-by-case basis, whether there is sufficient evidence that “a user
would associate the mark with” the identified services.139 The Federal
Circuit thus vacated and remanded the counterclaim case for
reconsideration under the proper legal standard.140 Upon remand, the
TTAB vacated its decision ordering cancellation of the Word Mark
registration and amendment of the Design Mark registration after Jobvite
failed to show good cause why it should not do so.141
II.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Although the Federal Circuit reversed the majority of lower court
rulings for the substantive issue cases discussed above—including two
of three TTAB rulings—it upheld all three TTAB rulings in appeals
related to procedural issues. These cases are discussed below.
A. Excusable Neglect
Westlake v. Barrera
In Westlake v. Barrera,142 the Federal Circuit held that the TTAB acted
within its discretion to dismiss a cancellation proceeding when it
1.

137. Id. at 940 (citing JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 3542849,
at *2).
138. Id. (quoting In re Ancor Holdings, No. 76213721, 2006 WL 1258813, at *3
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2006)). The Federal Circuit also noted that it had previously upheld
a TTAB decision recognizing that “software may be used by companies to provide
services.” Id. at 941; cf. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1088
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming that American Online, Inc. used its “ONLINE TODAY”
mark in connection with providing “users access to the [i]nternet news and
information service” as described in its service mark registration).
139. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 941–42 (internal citations omitted).
140. Id. at 936.
141. JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2017 WL 2391866, at
*1–2 (T.T.A.B. May 04, 2017).
142. 659 F. App’x 622 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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determined that the petitioner did not show good cause for his failure
to timely submit evidence to support his cancellation claim against a
third party’s registration.143
This case began when the petitioner, Mr. Westlake, filed a petition
for cancellation against a trademark registration owned by Mr.
Barrera, the respondent.144 The petition for cancellation alleged:
(1) that the respondent fraudulently procured the registration; and
(2) that the respondent’s mark falsely suggested a connection to
petitioner.145 The petitioner, however, failed to submit evidence to
support his claim, failing to even timely respond to the show cause
order issued six months after the initial July 29, 2014, deadline for
submitting testimony.146 Mr. Westlake offered no excuse for this delay
“except to say it was difficult to publish [his periodical] on a monthly
basis and respond to the various motions filed by” Mr. Barrera.147
To assess whether such grounds for failure to timely submit evidence
could be deemed “excusable neglect,”148 the TTAB borrowed from a
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment
143. Id. at 624. The Federal Circuit reviews such determinations of the TTAB under
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp.,
931 F.2d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
144. Under Registration No. 3,662,484, issued August 4, 2009, Mr. Barrera owns a
mark consisting of the words “THE NATIONAL POLICE GAZETTE THE LEADING
ILLUSTRATED SPORTING JOURNAL IN AMERICA” and the accompanying design:
Figure 3: Barrera Mark

Id.
145. Westlake, 659 F. App’x at 623; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012) (discussing the
requirements for a petition to cancel a registration of a mark).
146. Westlake, 659 F. App’x at 623.
147. Id. at 624 (alternation in original) (internal quotations omitted).
148. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 391–
95 (1993) (explaining that Courts of Appeals have found that “excusable neglect” may
apply in situations where a party’s failure to comply with a filing deadline was
inadvertent or was otherwise reasonable under a review of the totality of the
circumstances).
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Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.149 Under the Pioneer standard for
excusable neglect, the TTAB considered “‘all relevant circumstances,’
including ‘the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control
of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.’”150 Using
this rubric, the TTAB found that the petitioner’s “failure to take
testimony or offer evidence was not the result of excusable neglect.”151
The TTAB reasoned that this was inexcusable because the petitioner
did not seek an extension to file such evidence “until after [the TTAB]
issued its show-cause order” and “after the scheduled testimonysubmission periods of both parties had” long expired.152 Moreover, the
TTAB determined that the purported reason for the petitioner’s delay
was within his control, which “weigh[ed] strongly” against him.153
Having concluded that the neglect was not excusable, the TTAB
dismissed the cancellation petition.154
On appeal, Mr. Westlake asserted that the TTAB should have taken
“Mr. Barrera’s repeated delays and bad faith” into account in evaluating
whether his delay could be deemed excusable neglect.155 In reviewing the
TTAB’s decision, the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB had
considered “Mr. Barrera’s actions, [but] deem[ed] them not to excuse
Mr. Westlake’s failure to prosecute his case.”156 Moreover, to the extent
Mr. Westlake actually sought to have the Federal Circuit craft a new
standard for assessing excusable neglect, the Federal Circuit held that it
was not its “function under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.”157
Identifying no error in the TTAB’s use of the Pioneer standard of
“excusable neglect” and no abuse of discretion in its application of the

149. 507 U.S. 380, 381, 383 (1993); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (explaining
that a court may extend the time by which a party may comply with a court deadline if
the party moves for such an extension based on “excusable neglect”); TMEP
§ 509.01(b)(1)
(Oct.
2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tbmp-master-documentJun2017.pdf (“[M]ovant must show that its failure to act during the time previously
allotted therefor was the result of excusable neglect.”).
150. Westlake, 659 F. App’x at 623 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 395).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 624.
153. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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standard to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB
judgment in full.158
B. Failure to Function as a Trademark and Material Alteration on Appeal
In re Light
The Federal Circuit next addressed procedural issues raised in the
context of two appeals by pro se appellant Prema Jyothi Light, In re
Light (Light I )159 and In re Light (Light II ).160 The appeals were raised
in response to the TTAB’s refusal to register two marks consisting of
over 500 words each because of their failure to function as trademarks
and Light’s material alteration of the original applied-for marks.161
In July 2001, fifteen years before the Federal Circuit’s decision, Light
filed applications to register the full-text of the two images reproduced
below for use on cartoon prints, paper dolls, and coloring books.162

1.

158. Id. at 624–25.
159. In re Light (Light I ), No. 76293326, 2013 WL 6858009 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013).
160. In re Light (Light II ), No. 76293327, 2013 WL 6858010 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013).
161. See Light I, No. 76293326, 2013 WL 6858009, at *1; Light II, No. 76293327, 2013
WL 6858010, at *1.
162. In re Light (Light III), 662 F. App’x 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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Table I: Light’s Proposed Marks163
Application 1:
SHIMMERING BALLERINAS &
DANCERS CHARACTER
COLLECTION

Light’s proposed mark “ha[d]
approximately 660 words and
identifie[d] more than ninety
character names.”

Application 2:
SHIMMERING RAINFOREST
CHARACTER COLLECTION

Light’s proposed mark “had
approximately 570 words and
identifie[d] more than 125
character names.”

Light’s applications for these marks were initially rejected because the
examiner determined “that each sought to register multiple marks.”164
Light responded by attempting to amend the applied-for trademarks,
but those amendments were rejected because the proposed changes
were considered material alterations.165 The applications were deemed
abandoned after Light failed to timely respond to those refusals, but the
applications were later successfully revived and remanded to the
examining attorney to determine whether the original applied-for
marks constituted “registrable subject matter,” i.e., whether they
functioned as trademarks.166
Following the remand, the examining attorney refused registration on the
basis that the subject matter of the applications failed to function as
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 931–32.
Id. at 932.
Id.
Id.

1436

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1411

trademarks. The examining attorney explained that the full-text marks
“‘fail[ed] to function’ as trademarks,” but explained that “Light could
overcome the failure-to-function rejections by amending the proposed marks
to only seek registration of the stylized wording in the top left-hand
corners: . . . the ‘SHIMMERING BALLERINAS & DANCERS’ [and] the
‘SHIMMERING RAINFOREST.’”167 Light did not amend her claims as
advised or file new applications for more limited marks, but instead appealed
the examiner’s refusal, submitting revised specimens with even more details
and claiming that the “proposed marks had acquired distinctiveness in
accordance with [s]ection 2(f) of the Lanham Act.”168
In Light’s final administrative appeal, the TTAB affirmed the refusal
to register the marks, agreeing that the marks failed to function as
trademarks for two reasons: (1) the number of words was too great for
consumers to usefully differentiate one source from another; and
(2) the proposed amendments did nothing to assist the marks’ overall
subject matter because the “specimens reveal that the matters ‘merely
identif[y] what appears to be a title (e.g., of a story) and a list of
fanciful, fictional names.’”169 Additionally, the TTAB determined that
Light’s various proposed amendments “would effect material
alterations of the original subject matter” because each such
amendment would necessitate new conflicting mark searches.170 Light
appealed these decisions to the Federal Circuit, which reviewed and
ultimately upheld each determination in In re Light (Light III ).171
First, to reject Light’s contention that the marks should be registrable
because they were “easily recognizable,” the Federal Circuit explained
that the “mark must be perceived by the relevant public as conveying the
commercial impression of a trademark.”172 In other words, “the mark

167. Id.
168. Id. at 932–33.
169. Id. at 933 (last alteration in original) (quoting Light I, No. 76293326, 2013 WL
6858009, at *3–6 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013); Light II, No. 76293327, 2013 WL 6858010,
at *2–5 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013)).
170. Id. (describing the following as the specific issues with Light’s proposed
amendments: (1) “removing the columns and displaying the character names instead
in a radial or ‘starburst’ manner [would] ‘create[] a new commercial impression’”;
(2) “converting the proposed stylized mark to a ‘single standard character mark’
would likewise result in a mark ‘with a very different appearance and commercial
impression’”; and making similar observations about (3) “adding a ‘colorful
background, stars, and rays of light emanating from the top’” (quoting Light I,
2013 WL 6858009, at *7–8; Light II, 2013 WL 6858010, at *6–7)).
171. 662 F. App’x 929, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
172. Id.
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must identify the source of goods.”173 The court also noted the TTAB’s
numerous factual determinations “in support of its conclusion that the
relevant public would not perceive Light’s proposed marks as
identifying the source of goods.”174
Next, the Federal Circuit rejected Light’s claim that the amended
marks did not materially alter the original applied-for marks.175 Under
37 C.F.R. § 2.52, a trademark applicant must submit a drawing of the
mark and may amend a drawing so long as the amendments would not
“materially alter” the mark.176 According to Federal Circuit precedent,
an amendment is material if “the mark would have to be republished
after the alteration in order to fairly present the mark for purposes of
opposition.”177
Although the TTAB analyzed three distinct
amendments, Light only challenged the TTAB’s finding on one of
them.178 Other than Light’s reference to § 807.14(e)(ii) of the
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure,179 she failed to provide any
evidence to support this particular challenge.180 Given the evidence in
support of the TTAB’s rejection and the fact that it often uses § 807.14
in concluding that any additional elements requiring a further search
would constitute a material alteration,181 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the TTAB’s rejection of Light’s proposed amendments as well as its
judgment overall.182
173. Id. (citing In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
174. Id. at 934–35 (noting that “at best, ‘readers and users of [Light’s books would]
understand the applied-for matter as simply identifying a title or theme for [Light’s]
playbook, [and] a corresponding list of character names in the playbook’”) (last
alteration in original) (quoting Light I, 2013 WL 6858009, at *5; Light II, 2013 WL
6858010, at *4).
175. Id. at 937.
176. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(a)(2) (2016)).
177. Id. (quoting In re Hacot-Colombier, 105 F.3d 616, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
178. Id. (citing Light I, 2013 WL 6858009, at *7–8; Light II, 2013 WL 6858010, at *6–
7) (explaining that Light challenged the TTAB’s determination on her addition of “‘a
colorful background, stars, and rays of light emanating from the top left corner’” of
the mark (internal quotations omitted)).
179. Appellant’s Brief at 23, Light III, 662 F. App’x 929 (Nos. 2014-1597), 2015 WL
180577, at *23 (stating that § 807(e)(ii) requires “the addition, deletion, or
amendment of color features in a design mark does not result in a material alteration
of the mark”).
180. Light III, 662 F. App’x at 937.
181. The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure states that “the addition of any
element that would require a further search will constitute a material alteration.”
TMEP § 807.14 (Oct. 2017).
182. Light III, 662 F. App’x at 937. (last alteration in original) (citing In re Pierce
Foods Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. 307, 308 (T.T.A.B. 1986)).
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C. Anti-Trafficking Prohibition
In re Emerald Cities Collaborative Inc. v. Roese
In its last procedural trademark case of 2016, In re Emerald Cities
Collaborative Inc. v. Roese,183 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s
interpretation of a contract as an improper assignment of an intent-touse application to a third party in violation of the Lanham Act’s antitrafficking rule under 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1),184 rendering the
subsequently issued registration invalid.185
The ownership chain in this case starts with Perry Orlando, who
applied in November 2008 to register THE EMERALD CITY as a
standard character mark for use “in business development and
consulting services in the renewable energy industry.”186 In November
2009, the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance, giving Orlando until May
2010 to file a Statement of Use (“SOU”) to fulfil the Lanham Act’s use
in commerce requirements to register the mark.187
The next month, on December 30, 2009, Orlando signed a “perpetual”
and immediately effective “Trademark Assignment and License”
agreement (“Agreement”) with Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc.
(“ECC”).188 As relevant here, the Agreement stated that “Orlando
own[ed] certain rights in the [THE EMERALD CITY] Mark” and that
“Orlando agree[d] to convey and assign unto ECC, all right, title and
interest in and to the Mark . . . at such time as the Mark is registered at the
[PTO].”189 Additionally, the Agreement specified that “ECC [would]
promptly pay Orlando $25,000” and “upon payment of such amount, Mr.
Orlando [would] appoint[] Joel Rogers [ECC’s cofounder] as his Power
of Attorney (with the full power of substitution and resubstitution) for the
1.

183. 666 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
184. The anti-trafficking rule of 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) limits the assignment of
applications and prohibits the buying and selling—or trafficking—of non-existent
marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012) (“[N]o application to register a mark . . .
shall be assignable prior to . . . the filing of the verified statement of use . . . except for
an assignment to a successor to the business of the applicant . . . to which the mark
pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing.”).
185. In re Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc., 666 F. App’x at 909–10, 912; 15 U.S.C.
§ 1060(a)(1) (2012) (stating that “no application to register a mark under section
1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to the filing of an amendment under
section 1051(c)”).
186. In re Emerald City Collaborative Inc., 666 F. App’x at 909.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 909.
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limited purpose of allowing ECC . . . to take over continued prosecution of the
application for the Mark.”190 Lastly, the Agreement provided that ECC
would “pay Orlando $40,000 as a final installment upon registration of the
[M]ark at the PTO” and that, should ECC terminate the Agreement,
“Orlando [must] promptly cease use of the Mark.”191
In April 2010, Orlando filed the requisite SOU to support registration
of THE EMERALD CITY Mark, listing the date of first use “as early as
January 15, 2010,” and adding an appointment of counsel, namely, ECC’s
attorneys.192 The PTO accepted the SOU and registered the Mark on July
6, 2010 under Registration No. 3,814,868.193 That same day, Orlando
entered a written agreement with ECC assigning his “entire interest in the
[M]ark to ECC ‘with an effective date of July 6th 2010 . . . pursuant to
[the] 2009 Trademark Assignment.’”194
Three months later, in October 2010, ECC filed an action to oppose
registration of the mark EMERALD CITIES, which Sheri Jean Roese,
the applicant, had applied for in September 2009.195 To defend her
application, Roese counterclaimed to cancel ECC’s mark as invalid for
violating 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1)—the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking
rule.196 In particular, the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking rule states that
an application to register a mark through an intent-to-use application
may not be assignable prior to filing an SOU.197 The Lanham Act
provides only one exception to this rule, which permits assignment to
a successor of an applicant’s business if the business is ongoing and
existing.198 ECC did not claim that the Agreement fell within this
exception, but rather contended that the Agreement was not subject
to this provision because it did not transfer the mark until July 6,
2010.199 The TTAB, however, agreed with the applicant and canceled
ECC’s registration because it determined that the Agreement
190. Id. at 909–10 (alterations in original) (noting, in particular, that pursuant to
the Agreement, ECC would “be responsible for all payments in connection with the
continued prosecution of the Mark in the United States or its possessions” and “ECC
[would] have the exclusive right to file oppositions or claims against the users of
confusingly similar trademarks”).
191. Id. at 910.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (alteration in original).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 912 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012)).
198. Id. (quoting § 1060(a)(1)).
199. Id.
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“constituted an improper assignment of the intent-to-use application
[before the filing of the SOU] in violation of § 1060(a)(1).”200
On appeal, ECC, the appellant, asserted that the TTAB “erred in
construing the Agreement as an immediate assignment” that pre-dated
the April 2010 filing of the SOU.201 In support, ECC argued that “the
Agreement was merely an ‘agreement to assign [the Mark] in the
future’”—specifically, “upon registration” on July 6, 2010.202 ECC also
argued that the exclusive enforcement and quality control provisions
of the Agreement only applied after the Mark was registered and that
the Power of Attorney provision only created an “agent-principal
relationship between Orlando, the trademark owner, and the
appointed representative [ECC].”203 But, as explained below, the
Federal Circuit rejected all of these arguments.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit discussed three critical aspects of the
Agreement that were “inconsistent with the interpretation . . . advocated
by ECC that Orlando retained ownership between the effective date and
the registration date.”204 First, instead of establishing an agent-principal
relationship with Orlando as principal, the Agreement’s language
“indicate[d] that Orlando ceded control over the intent-to-use
application to ECC and instead became obligated to assist ECC in its
registration of the applied-for mark.”205 Second, “the Agreement
commence[d] on the Effective Date [of December 30, 2009]” and gave
ECC “the right to control the quality of goods and services sold under the
mark” starting from the Effective Date.206 And third, the Agreement did
not restrict the appellant’s right to enforce the Mark to only a specific
time period, but rather, prohibited Orlando from challenging the
appellant’s use of the Mark, before or after its registration date.207 The
Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that the Agreement’s purpose and
execution was for Orlando to relinquish the Mark to the petitioner
immediately as of the December 30, 2009, Effective Date.208
Having affirmed the TTAB’s determination that the Agreement violated
the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking rule, the Federal Circuit “further

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 910.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 912–13 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 913.
Id. at 912.
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conclude[d] that the [TTAB] did not err in cancelling” ECC’s registration
for THE EMERALD CITY.209 Lastly, “because ECC’s opposition to Roese’s
application was based solely on the now canceled registration,” the Federal
Circuit also affirmed the TTAB’s dismissal of ECC’s opposition to Roese’s
EMERALD CITIES mark.210
CONCLUSION
Perhaps less sensational than its 2015 docket, the Federal Circuit was
still relatively active in the area of trademark law in 2016. Its decisions
bookended the lifecycle of a trademark—from the threshold criteria
for obtaining a registration211 to the technicalities of losing one212 to
use in international trade213 and discrepancies in obtaining particular
enforcement remedies among the circuits.214 No doubt, the practical
impact of clarifying these essential aspects of trademark law will
influence trademark practice on a daily basis and reaffirm the Federal
Circuit’s significant contribution to the law of trademarks with a few,
well-reasoned decisions.

209. Id. at 914.
210. Id.
211. See In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d 936, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (covered goods
and services); Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 987–95
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (use in commerce); In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 599–606
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (genericness); Light III, 662 F. App’x 929, 936–38 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(failure to function as a source of goods or services).
212. See In re Emerald Cities Collaborative Inc., 666 F. App’x at 910–12 (discussing the
improper assignment of an intent-to-use application before filing an SOU).
213. See JBLU, Inc. v. United States, 813 F.3d 1377, 1379–82 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(relaxing country-of-origin labeling requirements for geographic terms associated with
all trademarks—federally registered and common law unregistered).
214. See Romag II, 686 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Romag I, 817 F.3d 782,
785–91 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

